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          經管學術論壇(管科028):薛巍立 教授—— Signaling Product Quality for Reward-based Crowdfunding under Competition

          報告題目: Signaling Product Quality for Reward-based Crowdfunding under Competition


          報告地點:騰訊會議,會 ID959 915 136(或點擊鏈接直接加入會議:https://meeting.tencent.com/s/7Gdp10iUNN9u

          報 告 人:薛巍立  東南大學經濟管理學院 教授



              薛巍立,東南大學經濟管理學院教授、博導,國家自然科學基金優秀青年科學基金獲得者,目前為中國系統工程學會會員,中國自動化學會經濟與管理系統專業委員會會員,中國管理現代化研究會運作管理專業委員會會員等。主要從事數字經濟環境下的運營與決策優化、供應鏈物流管理、服務運營管理等。發表SCI/SSCI論文20多篇,包括 Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Transportation Science等國際知名期刊;主持了多項省部級項目等。


          AbstractWe study a two-stage model in which a creator (she) determines whether to signal her product quality in the crowdfunding stage when facing potential imitator (he) who can decide his product quality and compete with the creator in the regular stage. If the creator signals her product quality, this could be a boon for backers by allowing them to make better informed pledging decision, and thus increases the fund raised in the crowdfunding stage. If not, the imitator will base his quality decision on their estimate of the creator's product quality, which may reduce the competitive intensity of the regular stage. We find that the imitator's quality strategy only depends on the consumer's loyalty to the crowdfunding product and production cost of a high-quality imitation product. Furthermore, we find that signaling product quality is achievable when the relative market size of regular stage is small. Specifically, when the imitator employs Homogenization Competition Strategy (HCS), the low-quality creator may be the one to resolve quality information uncertainty by reducing her reward price; while when the imitator chooses Differentiation Competition Strategy (DCS), the high-quality creator may set a even lower price than the low-quality creator to achieve separation. We also show that, under certain conditions, the high-quality creator can benefit from concealing her product quality information, and thus mislead the imitator into choosing a less competitive product; while the low-quality creator may prefer disclose her product quality information to the imitator in order to reduce the competitive intensity. Our main results remain robust under alternative model settings, including endogenous target goal, various introduction timing of the imitator's product and allowing non-pledging backers to remain in the regular stage.


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